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A great deal of scholarship over the last decade has been dedi­
cated to the roles of lawyers and the legal system in the movement 
for environmental justice, particularly in regard to their dual roles 
in combating the siting decisions of locally undesirable land uses 
("LULUs") in communities of color. Recognizing the low success 
ratesof environmental justice cases in the courts, the drawbacks of 
stare decisis, and the vast expenditure of resources devoted to these 
losing efforts, a recent trend among environmental justice propo­
nents appears to be a call for a moratorium on further litigation of 
environmental civil rights cases. Believing the legal system ulti­
mately fails as a means of achieving environmental justice, this 
school of thought, for which support has noticeably been growing, 
posits that lawyers concerned with environmental justice issues 
could serve more useful roles outside of the courtroom, and inside 
the communities they represent.1 
Finding the tenets of this "abandonment" camp to be overly 
simplistic, near-sighted, and ultimately detrimental to the environ­
mental justice movement, this article argues that lawyers should not 
give up the litigation tool as a means to fight environmental injus­
tice. Part I of this paper provides a survey of both case law and 
policy arguments that the abandonment camp has used to buttress 
* J.D. candidate, UCLA School of Law. The author would like to thank Adam 
Wolf of the ACLU for motivating him to look into the issues this paper addresses. He 
also thanks his fiancee, Tania Proechel, for all of her support and encouragement in the 
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1. Karen Smith, How the Legal System Has Failed the Environmental Justice 
Movement, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 325, 338 (1997). 
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its contention that litigating environmental civil rights cases is a 
fool's enterprise. Part II will counter these arguments with exam­
ples of how litigation in the environmental context can be beneficial 
both to affected communities and to the environmental justice 
movement as a whole. Part III explains that it is too early to for­
sake the litigation tool entirely, and argues for a complementary 
approach between lawyers and grassroots organizers for remedying 
environmental injustices. 
I. THE"ABANDONIST" CAMP ARGUMENT-LAWYERS SHOULD 

ABANDON THE LITIGATION TOOL FOR THE SAKE OF 

THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 

A. The Losing Record 
Over the last quarter-century, environmental justice lawyers 
have used a variety of legal tools and novel claims to fight the sit­
ings of LULUs in predominantly minority neighborhoods, often 
without success. The following passages outline the most common 
tools used, and their results. 
1. Strike 1: The Fall of Equal Protection Claims 
Beginning in 1979, creative lawyers sought to attack what ap­
peared to be racially discriminatory siting practices by bringing 
claims alleging civil rights violations, most notably under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In Bean v. 
Southwestern Waste Management Corp., plaintiffs sued to enjoin the 
siting of a LULU that was to be located within 1700 feet of a high 
school whose student population was predominantly African Amer­
ican, and only slightly farther from a predominantly African Ameri­
can neighborhood.3 The plaintiffs claimed the siting decision was a 
result of city-wide discrimination against minorities in the distribu­
tion of LULUs. To buttress their claims, plaintiffs provided census 
tract data revealing discriminatory impact trends as circumstantial 
evidence. According to the data, more waste sites were located in 
communities with high minority populations than in white commu­
nities.4 Despite these persuasive statistics, and despite finding the 
defendant's siting decision to be "insensitive," "unfortunate," and 
2. See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
3. Id. at 679. 
4. The site being directly challenged in Bean was located in a census tract with 
close to 60% minority population. Id. 
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"illogical," the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.5 The data sub­
mitted could not meet the evidentiary burden set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis6 and Village 
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpo­
ration,? which mandated that invidious discriminatory intent be 
proven for an equal protection violation to stand.8 
Since Bean, all courts presiding over equal protection cases in­
volving the siting of a LULU in a predominantly minority commu­
nity have persistently declined to find the requisite discriminatory 
intent without evidence of "a clear pattern [of discrimination], un­
explainable on grounds other than race."9 Unfortunately for envi­
ronmental civil rights plaintiffs, it has become incredibly rare in 
modern times to uncover a "smoking gun" transcript or record 
5. Id. at 681. 
6. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). In this case, certain minority applicants seeking em­
ployment with the Washington D.C. police force claimed that the Police Department's 
recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test (Test 21), were racially discrim­
inatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Having found 
that a disproportionate amount of African American test-takers failed, but finding no 
evidence of invidious discrimination, the Court refused to embrace the plaintiffs' pro­
position that "a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispropor­
tionate impact." Id. 
7. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In this case, the plaintiff claimed that one-family zoning in 
a Chicago suburb was racially motivated because it excluded apartment buildings. The 
plaintiff had sought a rezoning of land to allow it to build multi-racial apartment build­
ings. The court stated that the requisite intent to discriminate may be shown from cir­
cumstantial evidence but held that the plaintiff had failed to make a satisfactory 
showing. The land had been zoned for one-family dwellings before the plaintiff bought 
the land for his apartment building and the village had taken no overt actions to ensure 
that multi-racial apartment buildings would not be built. Id. 
8. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 681. 
9. Vill. of Arlington Heights., 429 U.S. at 266 (1977). Cases subsequent to Bean 
include: (1) East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989). Minority plaintiffs sought to re­
verse a decision by the local planning board to locate a landfill in a predominantly black 
community. Despite an abundance of evidence of disparate impact, the district court 
found "no specific antecedent events which support a determination that race was a 
motivating factor." Id. at 886. As in Bean, the court in East Bibb Twiggs refused to take 
into consideration the landfills and waste sites run by other agencies. Id. The judicial 
approach thus far appears to consider only the singular act of the defendant in and of 
itself, not in concert with all other siting decisions approved by the defendant agency or 
by all agencies who operate within that area. (2) R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 
1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding no discriminatory intent when a landfill permit was 
granted for an area of northern Virginia that was 64% black). The county had previ­
ously closed another landfill in a predominantly white area due to repeated operating 
and environmental violations. The court found that the county had selected the re­
gional landfill not because of the racial composition of the neighborhoods but because 
it was clearly superior in terms of environmental suitability. 
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where race-based animus is apparent on its face. What is more, the 
industry's implementation of so-called "race-neutral" criteria in 
LULU siting decisions will not allow any clear pattern of discrimi­
nation to emerge.10 
2. Strike 2: TItle VI 
Recognizing the pitfalls of equal protection litigation theories 
vis-a-vis the discriminatory intent standard, environmental justice 
lawyers were forced to look elsewhere for relief. As their alterna­
tive, lawyers sought to use the discrimination prohibitions for feder­
ally-funded entities under §§ 60111 and 60212 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.13 Lawyers sought to apply these civil rights 
laws in a manner that would halt government actors from issuing 
industrial use facility siting permits having disparate impacts on mi­
norities.14 TItle VI offered great potential because its scope was so 
10. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,324 (1987). 
11. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.c. §2oo0d (2000) ("No 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina­
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."). 
12. 42 U.s.c. § 2oo0d-l (2000). 

Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 

financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con­

tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed 

to effectuate the provisions of §601 [42 U.S.c. § 2000d] with respect to such 

program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applica­

bility which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the stat­

ute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is 
taken. 
Id. The statute goes on to say that federal grant monies can be refused if there are 
findings on the record that the recipient has not complied with the regulations designed 
to implement § 60l. 
13. See R. Gregory Roberts, Environmental Justice and Community Empower­
ment: Learning From the Civil Rights Movement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229 (1998) (ex­
plaining the potential benefits of litigating under §§ 601 and 602). 
14. See, e.g., Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997); S. Camden 
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). For further 
discussion of Title VI as a litigation tool, see Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism 
Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 296 (1995); 
James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125 (1994); Seth Schofield, 
Achieving Environmental Justice Through Title VI: Is It a Dead End?, 26 VT. L. REv. 
905, 925-26 (2002); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in 
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 531-34 (1994) [hereinafter Cole, Litigation] 
(discussing Title VI); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distri­
butional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 834-39 (1993) 
(discussing Title VI). 
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broad: the clause "program or activity" in § 601 encompasses all 
activities of a state or local agency that receive federal monies, 
which would include virtually any state environmental permitting 
agency.15 Thus, all actions, including permitting decisions for LU­
LUs, that are taken by state agencies funded by federal programs 
such as the EPA, are amenable to suit under Title VJ.16 
Unfortunately for environmental justice lawyers, the Supreme 
Court has construed § 601 lawsuits to be on a similar jurisprudential 
plane as equal protection suits, insofar as challenges to permitting 
decisions under § 601 must demonstrate intentional discrimination 
to make a prima facie case.17 Therefore, future direct challenges 
under § 601 are bound to be ineffective. Section 602, on the other 
hand, merely mandates that agencies, such as the EPA, distribute 
federal funds to promulgate regulations that implement § 601.18 
This section allows a federal agency to support a finding of non­
compliance with Title VI without proving intent to discriminate. 
For example, the EPA's implementing regulations19 prohibit recipi­
ents of EPA funds from using "criteria or methods of administering 
its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis­
crimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex."20 
The language of the regulation thus contemplates a purely discrimi­
natory impact standard. For once, a showing of disparate effect on 
the basis of race appears sufficient to bring a valid Title VI chal­
lenge against a siting decision. 
While a private right of action was not expressly granted in 
Title VI, such has been inferred by many environmental justice ad­
vocates over the years. After all, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts have acknowledged an implied private right of action under 
various remedial statutes in the past?1 and Title VII, a statute that 
15. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. State per­
mitting agencies typically receive federal funding for their regulatory and environmen­
tal protection functions. 
16. [d. 
17. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
18. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-1. 
19. The regulations were adopted in 1973 and amended in 1984. 
20. Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1984) (emphasis added). 
21. In I./. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), the Supreme Court found 
that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to 
make effective the congressional purpose [of the statute]." This liberal trend toward 
granting private rights of action was cut short ten years later by Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975). Cort set out a four-part test to determine whether a private right of action is 
implicit in a statute that does not explicitly state one. [d. at 78-85. The holding of Cort 
was later overruled, and the test for finding a private right of action was further nar­
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served a similar purpose, expressly granted a private right of action 
for retaliatory measures.22 Despite this optimism, recent Title VI 
decisions have proven unkind to environmental justice lawyers. In 
1998, the Supreme Court in Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living vacated a Third Circuit decision to recognize private 
party standing under a § 602 claim.23 Only a year later, the district 
court in New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v. Giuliani 
declined to acknowledge any private right of action under § 602 
regulations.24 
Perhaps the most crushing blow to the application of Title VI 
to siting decision challenges came in 2001 when the Supreme Court 
handed down a 5-4 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval.25 The San­
doval Court specifically held that Congress did not intend § 602 of 
Title VI to provide a private right of action for disparate impact 
discrimination claims.26 The Court reasoned that Congress had the 
power to create a private right of action directly-or at least to sug­
gest that one existed-but because it did not do so in § 602, such 
was not its intention. Justice Scalia's majority opinion made clear 
that, going forward, the focus of the Court should be "exclusively 
on legislative intent to create a private right of action."27 Without a 
right of environmentally injured plaintiffs to state their civil rights 
claims, the available litigation options under Title VI appear to be 
exhausted. 
3. Strike Three: Title VIII 
Like the premature hype surrounding Title VI, a handful of 
creative lawyers once found Title VIII28 to be a useful legal tool for 
litigating environmental justice cases,29 thanks in part to its broad 
rowed by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (holding that unless the legislative 
intent can be inferred from the language of the statute itself, a private right of action 
will not be implied). 
22. See Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964). 
23. 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
24. 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
25. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
26. Id. at 293. 
27. Id. at 296. In his attempt to articulate the legislative intent regarding implied 
rights under Title VI, Scalia noted: "Language in a regulation may invoke a private 
right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right 
that Congress has not." Id. 
28. 42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). 
29. See Flores v. Vill. of Bensenville, No. 00 C 4905, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4693, 
at *15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2003) (dismissing a Title VIII claim upon finding that the 
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reach. Specifically, § 3604(b) under Title VIII makes it unlawful to 
discriminate against any person "in the terms, conditions, or privi­
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of service or 
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin."30 Section 3617 makes it un­
lawful to "interfere with anybody's exercise or enjoyment of any 
right graded or protected by § 3604" of Title VIII,31 Under Title 
VIII, no showing of discriminatory intent is required, and thus an 
unjustified racially-disparate impact may alone be sufficient to es­
tablish a Title VIII violation.32 Furthermore, Title VIII applies to 
some purely private conduct, and so a showing of federal financial 
assistance is not always necessary.33 
However, Title VIII as applied has not been as successful a tool 
as environmental justice lawyers had hoped. Since, under the terms 
of 42 U.S.c. § 3604, Title VIII is tied directly to housing law, it has 
very specific application insofar as all claims must show a nexus to 
housing concerns.34 An action brought under Title VIII is designed 
to work when actual harm can be shown to a particular piece of 
property. A successful claim would usually depend on a full record 
showing such damage to a particular property. In this regard, Title 
VIII appears to be of little practical use as a tool for fighting envi­
ronmental civil rights abuses. 
4. The Effect of Losing Cases 
When looking at the bigger picture, the numerous court 
defeats speak less to the issue of siting LULUs in particular areas 
than they speak to the issue of legitimizing what is an otherwise 
town's provision of services had been consistently "dilatory" and that "there [was] no 
evidence to suggest that it responds more quickly to ... non-Hispanic individuals"); S. 
Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 508 
(D.N.J. 2003) (dismissing a Title VIII claim for failure to state a cognizable claim under 
the statute); El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 357 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty, Dec. 30, 1991) (failing to 
decide a Title VIII claim on the merits because the company chose a new site for the 
waste facility first). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. 
31. Id. 
32. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). See generally 3 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. 
SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AcrIONS § 19.07 (1983) (examining the extent to which 
discriminatory effects alone can constitute a violation of Title VIII). 
33. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 840. 
34. See generally 42 U.S.c. § 3604 (2000). 
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illegitimate system.35 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, future 
courts will likely find that environmental justice plaintiffs, even 
when armed with vast amounts of discriminatory impact data and 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, are not entitled to 
relief.36 Losses in court can not only delegitimize the efforts of the 
movement, but can also demoralize the participants, especially 
when so much time effort and hope have been dedicated to achiev­
ing a legal victory.37 Environmental justice lawyers' tough luck in 
court battles over the last two decades may be the primary justifica­
tion for affected communities' desire to abandon the legal process 
entirely, but it is not their only one. The following passages address 
additional concerns of the abandonment camp. 
B. Lawyers Have More Productive Roles to Play 
Environmental justice proponents recognize that even if their 
claims had more success in court, such "victories" could be over­
turned in the next lawsuit. In striving to effect more permanent 
remedies, various commentators and activists have suggested that 
lawyers take on alternative roles, closer to the community in which 
their clients live and therefore more likely effective. 
In what is perhaps the earliest academic article addressing law­
yers' roles in the environmental justice movement, if not the earli­
est article addressing the movement itself, professors Regina Austin 
and Michael Schill suggested that while legal expertise should be 
"de-emphasized" and extralegal activities should be the primary fo­
cus of the movement, lawyers still have many alternative supporting 
roles to fill: 
[Lawyers] facilitate the release of demonstrators from police cus­
tody; secure protection of protestors' first amendment rights; re­
present complainants before regulatory agencies; and accompany 
activists to meeting and conferences where the other side is sure 
to be represented by counsel. Lawyers clarify the power of gov­
35. Luke W. Cole, Lawyers, the Law & Environmental Justice: Dangers for the 
Movement, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Fall 2004-Winter 2005, at 3 [hereinafter Cole, 
Dangers]. 
36. See Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979); see 
also Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991); 
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
37. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority 
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 
1, 75 (1991). 
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ernment agencies to do what the activists are demanding and as­
sist in the assessment of the available strategies to determine 
which will have the most impact on the polluter.38 
Commentator Luke Cole agrees with the suggestions of Austin 
and Schill, and believes that lawyers can play an effective grassroots 
role by advising their community clients about the legality of spe­
cific protests, demonstrations, and civil disobedience actions, as 
well as by helping clients organize successful campaigns.39 
Cole has descriptively referred to a "professional model" of ad 
hoc advocacy for environmental justice attorneys, whereby they 
concern themselves not with overturning siting decisions already 
made, but instead concentrate their efforts on the permitting 
processes that grant industry the right to use the land in question in 
undesirable ways.40 Under this model, beginning with the pre-appli­
cation meeting through the subsequent scoping meetings and public 
hearings, lawyers would use their legal expertise to provide written 
testimony and file comments on behalf of the local residents they 
represent.41 This strategy, Cole asserts, works to attack environ­
mental injustices before they begin, as opposed to waiting for the 
damage to be done and then relying on the courts to provide a last­
resort remedy.42 
Even if environmental lawyers were to follow the "professional 
model" described above, Luke Cole believes these lawyers would 
have "a detrimental effect on the national environmental justice 
movement" and may ultimately "prove to be the movement's undo­
38. Id. 
39. Luke w. Cole, Community Initiatives: Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, 
and Grassroots Activists Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 
687,702 (1995) [hereinafter Cole, Three Models]; see also Richard Toshiyuki Drury & 
Flora Chu, From White Knight Lawyers to Community Organizing, RACE, POVERTY & 
ENV'T, Fall 1994-Winter 1995, at 52 (stating that lawyers are often most effective not 
when they attempt to solve problems of the community through litigation, lobbying or 
advocacy, but rather, when they work together with the affected community groups to 
help them identify ways to solve their own problems through community organizing; 
this role will usually not involve litigation); Pat Bryant, The Movement & The Legal 
Community, RACE, POVERTY, AND ENV'T, Fall 2004-Winter 2005, at 2 [Hereinafter 
Bryant, The Movement] (stating that Community Enviro-Justice activists "have little 
faith in [lawyers'] ability to provide much more than technical assistance (e.g. filing 
court documents, research, etc.)"). 
40. One of the biggest complaints grassroots activists have with utilizing the legal 
system is that judicial remedies tend to focus on curing past harms at the expense of 
finding preemptive approaches to eliminate the threat of future harm. See Cole, Three 
Models, supra note 39, at 693-94. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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ing" because lawyers take matters out of the hands of the commu­
nity and impede the development of local grassroots groupS.43 
When lawyers are given the power to call the shots, the legally un­
sophisticated community that stands to be harmed is left out of the 
100p.44 Local residents learn nothing of the dangers they face 
under the litigated proposals, nor do they learn anything substan­
tive about the permitting and siting processes.45 In Cole's mind, 
lawyers should only serve to empower the community they re­
present, and to arm it with the resources, expertise, information and 
legal/political savvy "not only to reject and oppose, but also to for­
mulate, initiate, and implement its own plans, and to monitor the 
administration and operation of such initiatives."46 Cole's insights 
on lawyers' roles lend some guidance to the next theory we must 
consider. 
C. 	 Lawyers' Goals are in Conflict With Those of the 
Environmental Justice Movement 
"We speak for ourselves" has been the maxim of the environ­
mental justice movement since its inception.47 Many scholars argue 
that the main source of environmental injustice is the exclusion of 
affected communities from the decisionmaking table.48 The answer 
to environmental racism, they assert, lies in community empower­
ment and local decisionmaking, not in laws and litigation.49 Politi­
cal change should not take place solely through the courts-if at 
all-but instead through the demands of those who seek recogni­
tion of their political and civil rights. 
By transforming the collective struggle for environmental jus­
tice into a single lawsuit, it is argued, the community does not speak 
43. 	 Id. at 704. 
44. 	 Id. 
45. 	 Id. 
46. Id. at 708; see also Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental 
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 668 
(1992) [hereinafter Cole, Empowerment] (urging legal services attorneys to empower 
poor and minority communities to participate in the political decision making process). 
47. This motto "hints at [the movement's] focus on local organizations and local 
solutions, and its resistance to the kinds of corporate-controlled globalization that have 
sparked protests around the world." Ben Helphand, Nicole Leistikow & Laura Nathan, 
Editor's Choice: Top 10 Crusaders for Social Justice, IN THE FRAY ONLINE MAGAZINE, 
Nov. 13, 2003, http://inthefray.comlhtmUarticle.php?sid=110&mode=thread&order=O). 
See generally WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE AND ENVIRONMENT 
(Dana A. Alston ed., 1990). 
48. 	 See generally Cole, Three Models, supra note 39. 
49. 	 Id. 
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for itself but shifts a great responsibility onto the shoulders of just 
one or two lawyers who are expected to represent the interests of 
an entire community. 50 Using the law as a primary tool to battle 
these injustices "takes the fight away from arenas in which the peo­
pIe ... have some direct influence-their politicians, local develop­
ment company offices, residences of the CEO, ... etc.-to a place 
where they don't, i.e., in some chamber controlled by a judge where 
only the lawyers are allowed to speak ...."51 One cannot help but 
notice the irony of environmental-justice lawyers making decisions 
concerning communities and environments that will not affect them 
personally. After all, this is precisely the kind of decisionmaking 
scheme the environmental justice movement has sought to de­
throne. Similarly, given the elitism, opportunism, and political ca­
reerism that permeates the legal profession, many community 
activists are skeptical about how adequately lawyers will address 
concerns not directly affecting them, and whether they can be held 
accountable.52 
Some commentators have argued that the solution to the envi­
ronmental justice problem lies not with attempting to brand gov­
ernment decisionmakers as racists, but in electing minority 
community members to siting boards, so that minority and other 
residents at high risk are given a voice and have first-hand access to 
risk information. 53 By this logic, equal protection concerns, and a 
desire to achieve substantive equality in siting results would cease 
to be controversial issues so long as minority groups were ade­
quately represented in the siting process.54 
Another major drawback many environmental justice propo­
nents have faced is a perpetual lack of resources to sustain their 
movement.55 Without state or government funding, local commu­
50. Cole, Dangers, supra note 35, at 4; see also Drury & Chu, supra note 39, at 52. 
51. Francis Calpotura, Why the Law?, RACE, POVERTY & ENv'T, Fall 1994-Win­
ter 1995, at 1. 
52. Bryant, The Movement, supra note 39, at 2. 
53. See Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk­
Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 378 (1995); 
see also Edward Patrick Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, 
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection 
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937 (1993). 
54. Mank, supra note 53, at 378. 
55. See Stacy J. Silveira, Comment, The American Environmental Movement: Sur­
viving Through Diversity, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 497, 522 n.218 (2001) (referenc­
ing FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: 
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 24 (1977)) ("[S]ufficient resources are usually 
unavailable to poor and disadvantaged groups who lack time and money. The success 
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nity groups usually must rely on donations, literature subscriptions, 
and out-of-pocket monies to keep their campaigns thriving. Pro­
tracted litigation therefore operates, however indirectly, to 
"wither" community groups by pumping large amounts of resources 
out of the community and into the legal system.56 From a cost-ben­
efit perspective, even a few modest courtroom victories could 
hardly be worth the expense of an entire community organization's 
collapse under the weight of its own litigation. 
II. COUNTER ARGUMENT-WHY ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 

LITIGATORS SHOULD NOT GIVE Up THE FIGHT 

The current state of equal protection and civil rights law in the 
environmental context no doubt makes it difficult for environmen­
tal justice lawyers to vindicate their clients' rights. But abandoning 
the courts is not the answer. Despite the growth of assessments to 
the contrary, the litigation tool is not a "lost cause" for the move­
ment. To be sure, if racial discrimination-however overt or sub­
dued-is part and parcel of modern-day LULU siting decisions, 
then remedies for past discrimination, as well as measures taken to 
prevent future discrimination, are warranted. This article argues 
that such remedies and preventive measures are more likely to be 
won by lawyers assuming their traditional roles as litigators, and not 
as background players or organizers/supporters in a larger grass­
roots network. 
When placed against the background of civil rights cases in 
general, cases that courts have amended and fine-tuned over the 
last half-century, environmental justice jurisprudence is in its rela­
tive infancy. Taking the environmental justice fight out of the legal 
arena is not only a premature move, but also a counterproductive 
one. This portion of the article argues that a continuance of envi­
ronmental civil rights litigation will serve a variety of social, politi­
cal, and institutional functions. The following passages suggest a 
rate for the mobilization of poor and disadvantaged groups depends on the amount, not 
the type, of resources available to those groups."); see also Willie A. Gunn, From the 
Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Allevi­
ate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 1227, 1249 (1996) (noting that poor 
communities "will usually lack the financial resources to resist the siting of unwanted 
facilities"); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and 
Class as Factors in the Distribution ofEnvironmental Hazards, 63 V. COLO. L. REV. 921, 
924 (1992) ("Communities where hazardous waste sites are located tend to be commu­
nities in which residents are unaware of the policy decisions affecting them, [and the] 
residents are unorganized and lack resources for taking political action ...."). 
56. Drury & Chu, supra note 39, at 52. 
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broad range of alternative methods that future lawyers may wish to 
employ in their quest for environmental justice. 
A. Creative Approaches to Litigation 
1. 	 Meeting the Evidentiary Burden for Discriminatory 
Intent 
As the law currently stands, a court will almost never impute 
subjective discriminatory intent from disparate impact data alone.57 
As the cases cited above have shown, almost all courts refuse to 
impute discriminatory purpose even when impact data is combined 
with additional forms of persuasive circumstantial evidence. 58 The 
question all environmental justice attorneys are faced with, then, 
notwithstanding the discovery of a "smoking gun" memo,59 is, what 
evidence can realistically be marshaled to prove discriminatory in­
tent? This article asserts that the determination of what evidence is 
necessary cannot be made until two preliminary-and yet all-im­
portant-questions have been answered: (1) What is statistically 
significant discrimination? (2) What is the relevant geographical 
area affected by the facility, and how do we define it? 
a. 	 What is statistically significant discrimination? 
1. 	 Yick Wo and its progeny 
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., the South­
ern District Court of Texas echoed a remark that dozens of courts 
presiding over equal protection cases have recited over the past 
hundred years: "Statistical proof can rise to the level that it, alone, 
proves discriminatory intent."6o Yet in the century-old history of 
equal protection jurisprudence, only two Supreme Court cases have 
held that a statistical showing of substantial disparate impact was 
sufficient to impute discriminatory intent on the part of the defen­
dant-Yick Wo v. Hopkins 61 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot.62 
In Yick Wo, a city ordinance prohibited laundries from operat­
ing in wooden buildings without the consent of the city's board of 
57. 	 See supra notes 6-9. 
58. 	 Id. 
59. For instance, any inter-office memorandum that, on its face, directly implies 
or proves that invidious discrimination was the impetus behind a siting decision. 
60. 	 Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (1979). 
61. 	 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
62. 	 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
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supervisors.63 This ordinance however, was only enforced against 
people of Chinese ancestry.64 While white laundry owners were 
granted exemptions from the ordinance upon request, Chinese 
owners were uniformly denied such exemptions.65 Thus, the dis­
criminatory impact this ordinance had in application denied this 
particular class of their equal protection under the law. Using the 
data before it, the Supreme Court inferred that the city had "with 
evil eye and unequal hand" applied the ordinance in a wrongfully 
discriminatory fashion.66 
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, black residents of the city of Tus­
kegee, Alabama challenged the state legislature's decision to rede­
fine the boundaries of Tuskegee from a square-shaped city to a 
"strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure."67 This boundary re­
definition resulted in the removal from the city limits of all but 
"four or five" of Tuskegee's four hundred black voters, while all of 
the Tuskegee's white voters remained.68 Finding that the statistics 
provided were enough to warrant an equal protection violation, the 
Court concluded that the state's decision to alter the city's bounda­
ries was "tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical 
demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segre­
gating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of 
town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote. "69 
Since Gomillion, discriminatory intent has been inferred from 
impact data in only three federal cases.7° Perhaps not coinciden­
tally, all three cases dealt with the wrongful misallocation of munic­
ipal services, and all three were tried in the Eleventh Circuit within 
a span of three years during the 1980s.71 These municipal service 
cases were brought by black residents representing the minority 
contingent of their neighborhoods against their respective munici­
palities.72 The plaintiffs in all three cases argued that the disparity 
63. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. 
64. Id. at 374. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 373-74. 
67. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 985 (Eleventh Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. 
City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Eleventh Cir. 1983); Baker v. Kissimmee, 645 
F. Supp. 571, 585-86 (M.D. Fla. 1986). 
71. Ammons, 783 F.2d at 983-84; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184; Baker, 645 F. Supp. 
at 573. 
72. Ammons, 783 F.2d at 983-84; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184; Baker, 645 F. Supp. 
at 573. 
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in providing municipal services (such as street paving, water distri­
bution and storm-water drainage) between the white part of town 
and their black part of town was so stark that the magnitude of the 
disparity should be sufficient to infer a discriminatory intent.73 The 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and 
two separate panels from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed.74 Based on its own interpretation of the factor-based test 
set out in Arlington Heights for imputing discriminatory intent,75 
the Eleventh Circuit in Dowdell v. City of Apopka, much like the 
other two courts, held that "the magnitude of the disparity, evidenc­
ing a systematic pattern of municipal expenditures in all areas of 
town except the black community, is explicable only on racial 
grounds. "76 
Professor Rachel Godsil has argued that these municipal ser­
vices decisions "recognize that for a city to bestow benefits on white 
communities while ignoring black communities is to violate The 
Equal Protection Clause. Burdening minority communities while 
allowing white neighborhoods to remain relatively free of toxic 
waste suggests a violation of equal protection as well. "77 Although 
Professor Godsil's argument is logical, it gives too short shrift to the 
analysis behind these decisions. What application Yick Wo, Gomil­
lion and the municipal services cases have to LULU-based environ­
mental justice cases is murky at best. 
What Yick Wo, Gomillion and the municipal services cases had 
in common was a lack of any rational purpose for the discrimina­
tory impact caused by the government decision being challenged.78 
73. Ammons, 783 F.2d at 983-84; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184; Baker, 645 F. Supp. 
at 573. 
74. Ammons, 783 F.2d at 983-84; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184; Baker, 645 F. Supp. 
at 573. 
75. These factors, probative of discriminatory intent include: (1) the nature and 
magnitude of the disparity itself (discriminatory impact); (2) foreseeability of the conse­
quences of the City's actions; (3) legislative and administrative history of the decision­
making process; and (4) knowledge, in that a defendant's actions would be known to 
have caused the disparity or discriminatory impact that resulted from their conduct. 
Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977). 
76. Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186 (emphasis added). 
77. Rachel Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394,416­
17 (1991). 
78. For example, the Court in Yick Wo stated: "No reason whatever, except the 
will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the 
accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a 
livelihood." 118 U.S. 356, 377 (1886). Likewise, the Court in Gomillion noted: "The 
complaint amply alleges a claim of racial discrimination. Against this claim the respon­
dents have never suggested, either in their brief or in oral argument, any countervailing 
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The defendants in these cases could not craft any legitimate pur­
pose or any articulable explanation for the discrimination. Without 
any justification whatsoever for the government's actions, the 
courts in these cases were compelled to find purposeful discrimina­
tion based on the impact data alone, lest they risk handing down a 
severely and conspicuously unjust decision.79 
Attempting to rely on any of these cases is likely to be a losing 
effort for the environmental justice movement. First, it will be a 
rare case indeed when there are enough LULUs in anyone area to 
create an "overwhelmingly stark disparity."80 Second, the neutral 
siting criteria used by government/industry in the environmental 
context serves to justify whatever disparities exist post-decision.81 
Moreover, in the few cases where courts have imputed discrimina­
tory intent from impact data alone, the remedy proffered by the 
court was rather easy to implement-the defendants were simply 
ordered to provide equal service to both minority and white com­
munities.82 Trying to fashion an equitable remedy in the LULU sit­
ing context is a bit more complex because LULUs need to be sited 
somewhere, and a court's decision to enjoin a siting decision in one 
community only pushes the problem onto another community. 
11. What guidance do we get from recent case law? 
Despite ruling against the plaintiffs, the court in Bean v. South­
western Waste Management was sympathetic to the environmental 
justice claims before it. In handing down its decision, the court 
pointed the plaintiffs in the direction of "more persuasive evi­
dence" that could be obtained during discovery prior to tria1.83 For 
example, the court stressed its continued desire to know exactly 
how sites were selected.84 What process do private contractors and 
city officials use when siting a LULU? How many-if any-alter­
native sites are considered? If multiple sites are considered, what 
methods are employed to decide between Site A over Site B? And 
so forth. 
municipal function which Act 140 is designed to serve." 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960). The 
defendant in Dowdell also refused to argue the absence of discriminatory intent. Dow­
dell, 698 F.2d at 1184 n.1. 
79. Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; Ammons, 783 F.2d 982; Dow­
dell, 698 F.2d 118; Baker, 645 F. Supp. 571. 
80. Godsil, supra note 77, at 418. 
81. See generally Colopy, supra note 14. 
82. See generally supra note 70. 
83. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
84. Id. 
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The court also stated that the evidence relevant to the defen­
dant's knowledge regarding discriminatory effects could be help­
fu1.85 For instance, to what extent were the decisionmakers aware 
that the site was in proximity to residential neighborhoods? To 
what extent were they informed that the neighborhood was com­
posed predominantly of minorities?86 How much-if any-consid­
eration was given to these factors? 
The district court in East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Associa­
tion v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission did not 
expressly state the specific types of circumstantial evidence or sta­
tistical data necessary to impute discriminatory intent.87 However, 
the court was sympathetic enough to shed some light on the types 
of evidence future environmental justice plaintiffs should hunt for 
before filing their next claim: (1) evidence of recent zoning changes; 
(2) evidence of relaxations in siting/permitting procedure; and (3) 
evidence that city/state officials actively solicited the LULU appli­
cation under constitutional attack.88 
111. Flaws in current impact data must be rectified 
One major problem with most statistical impact studies (or at 
least those that have been used in court to date) is they tend to 
show current socio-economic and racial disparities within host com­
munities while neglecting to establish that such disproportions ex­
isted at the time of the siting decision.89 The question, of course, 
then arises whether the siting process was itself discriminatory or 
whether the neighborhoods attracted a disproportionate percentage 
of minorities. Because little, if any, disparate-impact research has 
85. Id. 
86. In Yick Wo, for instance, the same decisionmakers decided all 320 ordinance­
mandated permit questions. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356 (1886). Thus, they were 
able to compare the results, and would have had difficulty avoiding the knowledge that 
their actions created a severely disproportionate racial impact against on Chinese 
Americans. See David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent and Evil: The Paradox of Pur­
poselessness in the Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 
291 (1998). 
87. 706 F. Supp. 880, 884. 
88. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989). Note that some of the court's sugges­
tions correspond directly with factors meeting the test set forth in Arlington Heights. Id. 
89. Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dis­
proportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994) [hereinafter 
Been, Market Dynamics]; Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmen­
tal Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 
1062 (1993) [hereinafter Been, Fairness]. 
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addressed the considerations posed by basic market dynamics, 
courts and legislators are often left wondering, despite the current 
racial disparities, whether any equal protection violation existed at 
the time of the siting. If the disproportionate distribution of LU­
LUs stems from market forces, rather than overt discrimination, 
then the causal nexus for environmental civil rights plaintiffs is lack­
ing, and the equal protection claims lose merit. The only remaining 
solution would be for the plaintiffs to indict the free-market econ­
omy rather than industry and government decisionmakers; obvi­
ously, this is not a winning argument.90 
What is most desperately needed is research examining (1) the 
racial composition (2) of the host neighborhood (3) at the time of 
the siting decision (4) that traces the changes in composition over 
time.91 To ensure accuracy and accountability, those conducting 
these studies would have to implement measures to control vari­
ables other than race that may have an effect on where LULUs are 
ultimately sited.92 
b. 	 What is the relevant geographical area affected by the facility, 
and how do we define it? 
Before courts attempt to redress any claims alleged by a plain­
tiff class, they will want to know what portion of society the govern­
ment decision is going to impact. Exactly how large a geographic 
area will the LULU adversely affect? Once the affected area is es­
tablished, what would be the most appropriate way to survey that 
area? Should the statistical impact data offered as evidence be cat­
egorized by counties, municipalities, or zip codes? What about cen­
sus tracts, block groups, service areas, or perhaps something more 
statistically significant? Certainly, the more precise the target area, 
and the more accurate the statistics, the more persuasive the evi­
dence will be. However, almost any boundary definition will be 
constrained by its own share of over/under-inclusiveness problems, 
as some earlier courts have pointed OUt.93 Deciding what criteria 
90. 	 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 89, at 1391. 
91. 	 See id. at 1406. 
92. See Been, Fairness, supra note 89, at 1062 (discussing how "failure to control 
variables other than race" can affect accuracy). 
93. The Bean court requested evidence from the plaintiffs as to precisely where 
the solid waste sites were located in the census tracts they provided the court. Bean v. 
Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673,680 (S.D. Tex. 1979). The court implied that 
since the LULU affected an area that was considerably smaller than that of a census 
tract, it was particularly important to know where in the census tract the site was lo­
cated. Id. The court suggested that it would have been more inclined to find for the 
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should be used in defining the boundaries of evidentiary impact 
studies is no easy task, and should certainly be the focus of greater 
academic inquiry. Unfortunately, the finer points of proper bound­
ary-drawing are beyond the scope of this paper. 
2. 	 The "Special Justification" Presented by "Aversive" 
Racism and the Need for a Lower Standard of 
Proof 
The intent-mandated holdings of Davis and Arlington Heights 
have no doubt created the toughest hurdle for environmental-jus­
tice plaintiffs to overcome. These decisions have created a cumber­
some burden by treating equal protection violations as though they 
were criminal in nature, requiring a culpable state of mind. Under 
Davis and Arlington Heights, racial discrimination is viewed strictly 
as a willful act, and racists are "evil" because their "race-based deci­
sions are made on a conscious level."94 Indeed, courts have looked 
too narrowly at what constitutes racism. 
Some scholars have expressed concern over the Supreme 
Court's recognition of only "the most evident manifestations of 
race discrimination."95 These scholars argue that the Court has 
spent too much time attempting to trace discriminatory results to 
specific bigoted actors or specific bigoted acts, without acknowledg­
ing the possibility that discriminatory intent may very well be pre­
sent in the absence of such evidence.96 
Recent psychological studies have suggested that in contempo­
rary, politically-correct society, racism, and the racial discrimination 
that results from it, is, by and large, "aversive."97 "Aversive ra­
plaintiff had the plaintiff shown that most sites located in predominantly "Anglo" cen­
sus tracts were in fact located next to black communities. Id. 
94. 	 Boyle, supra note 53, at 963. 
95. /d. at 989. Boyle argues that the intent standard adopted in Arlington Heights 
and Davis is inherently flawed on many levels, because it demonstrates a clear "misun­
derstanding of the causes and manifestations of racial discrimination." Id. at 963. 
96. Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Chal­
lenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental Regulation, 29 B.c. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 156 (2002). 
97. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 987-89 (1993) 
(providing empirical evidence supporting the contention that race affects most white 
decision making most of the time); see also John F. Dovidio et aI., Stereotyping, 
Prejudice, and Discrimination: Another Look, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 
276,288 (c. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The 
Aversive Form ofRacism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 61-89 (John 
F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) [hereinafter Gaertner, The Aversive 
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cism" occurs where those who acquire "racist attitudes early in life 
... unconsciously use [those attitudes] to process [current] informa­
tion about their environment and to decide how to act."98 Cogni­
tive processes in the mind of an aversive racist create stereotypes to 
make the wealth of information in their environment easier to un­
derstand.99 While these individuals may be consciously aware that 
racism is wrong, "their cognitive development essentially has 
predisposed them to make decisions based on racist beliefs any­
way."100 According to this theory, it is quite possible for a person 
wrongfully to discriminate on the basis of race, without being con­
sciously aware of his or her discriminatory behavior.101 The "aver­
sive racism" theory likens the modern institution of racism to a 
virus which has mutated, and has evolved into a form that is not 
only more difficult to detect, but more difficult to combat as well.102 
Aversive racism is not limited to individuals; indeed, it can also 
operate in an institutional setting. This phenomenon is most nota­
bly manifested in social institutions, where the power structure is 
arranged so that the dominant maintain dominance over other 
groups.103 In organizational decisionmaking, the presence of aver­
sive racism no doubt presents a substantial challenge to the goal of 
racial equality. It is not unreasonable to infer that when blatantly 
discriminatory outcomes cannot be traced back to any particular 
actor or act, the institutions and decisionmaking processes them­
selves were biased against racial minorities, or alternatively, that 
the siting decisions occurred in a "climate" of purposeful discrimi­
nation.104 Commentator Edward Boyle suggests that if much of the 
environmental decisionmaking that results in disparate impact can 
be linked to aversive-racism premises-which he believes it can­
then equal-protection analysis should primarily focus not on 
Form). See generally James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Blacks 
Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 518 (1982). 
98. Boyle, supra note 53, at 939. 
99. See id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id.; see also John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the 
Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91, 91-125 (John 
F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (arguing that "modern racists" are largely 
unaware of their racist feelings). 
102. See Gaertner, The Aversive Form, supra note 97, at 84-85. 
103. Id. 
104. Colopy, supra note 14, at 150 n.l13 (1994) (citing a phone interview with 
Michael M. Daniel, attorney for the West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice, 
on Mar. 23, 1993). 
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whether there exists proof of manifested racist intent,105 but on 
whether the decisionmaking processes were structured in ways that 
preordained disparate and discriminatory treatment of 
minorities. lo6 
Boyle contends that when political and social systems are 
structured and operate to marginalize communities of color, keep­
ing minority voices out of the decisionmaking process, courts must 
recognize that the underlying racism is no less apparent, despite the 
fact that its overtness may be masked by so-called "neutral" deci­
sionmaking criteria.107 The use of neutral criteria in siting decisions 
is in no real way antithetical to de facto discrimination, yet courts 
will often grant officials the "benefit of moral doubt" when race­
neutral reasons are cited for a decision. lOS Followers of the "aver­
sive racism" school of thought strongly believe that courts should 
cease to legitimize the presumption that invidious (overt) racism is 
blameworthy, while insidious (unconscious) racism is not.109 Sys­
tematized racism, no doubt, can be just as dangerous as racism with 
specific intentPO Both forms of racism" 'contribute to the restric­
tion of opportunity for blacks and other minorities' and [work to] 
'perpetuate the social and economic advantages of the majority 
group over minority groupS."'l1l To be sure, the absence of eco­
nomic and political power in communities of color makes it far 
more likely that inherently racist social and political institutions will 
dominate, and that minorities will be disproportionately affected by 
environmental burdens.112 "[B]y emphasizing procedural safe­
guards over substantive results [federal courts have thus far] suc­
cessfully remove[d] the 'teeth' from antidiscrimination law and 
105. See Boyle, supra note 53, at 944 (referring to this as "dominative" racism). 
106. Id. at 988. 
107. Id. 
108. Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1163, 1164-65 (1978). 
109. Colopy, supra note 14, at 151 (arguing that the harms of racial inequality 
exist independently of discriminatory intent). 
110. See generally Lawrence, supra note 10, at 324. See also Gary Stewart, Black 
Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil In­
junctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2250 (1998) (claiming that "[the] differences in the trans­
parency of racist attitudes and actions do not necessarily reveal differences in the 
harmful effects that these attitudes and actions might impose on minority 
communities"). 
111. Stewart, supra note 110, at 2270 (citing John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. 
Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and 
Challenges of Aversive Racism, in RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 18,31 
(Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fisher eds., 1988». 
112. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 808. 
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enable[d] the dominant white culture to evade the burden of reme­
dying institutional racism. "113 
Without addressing aversive racism specifically, but arguing 
from the similar premise that fairness requires treatment as equals, 
environmental law scholar Vicki Been states: 
Even if discrimination is unintentional or based upon characteris­
tics that do not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause, disproportionate siting arguably would be inappropriate 
if it stemmed from a siting process that failed to treat people with 
'equal concern and respect,'instead valuing certain people less 
than others. Under this theory, if a siting process is more atten­
tive to the interests of wealthier or white neighborhoods than to 
the interests of poor or minority neighborhoods, that process ille­
gitimately treats the poor and people of color as unequal. 
... [To be fair,] the siting decision would have to consider 
the interests of the poor just as fully and sympathetically as it 
considered the interests of the more wealthy.114 
In light of the compelling empirical data and scholarly argu­
ments validating the existence of aversive racism at our disposal, 
one is left to ponder how plaintiffs' lawyers may implement recent 
findings and understanding of aversive racism in their quest for en­
vironmental justice. What role-if any-can the finding of aversive 
racism play in future environmental justice advocacy? Given the 
volumes of data that have already been compiled on the discrimina­
tory impact of LULU sitings over the last quarter-century, one an­
swer would be to combine the existing impact data with empirical 
data on aversive racism to demonstrate to the courts why the cur­
113. Colopy, supra note 14, at 152. 
114. Been, Fairness, supra note 89, at 1063-64. On the issue of failure "to treat 
people with 'equal concern and respect,''' Been cites R. George Wright, Hazardous 
Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777, 
784-87, 790 (1991). According to Been, "Professor Wright calls this a 'stigmatic' in­
jury." Been, Fairness, supra note 89 at 1064 n.339. "Treating people or neighborhoods 
as equals does not demand that they receive equal treatment of the kind required by 
the equal division theory discussed earlier." Id. at 1064 n.340. Been directs readers to 
PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE 
OF 'EQUALITY' IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 270-71 (1990) (quoting Charles 
Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS 191, 192 (1971)) "for a discussion of the 
difference between the concepts of treatment as equals and equal treatment." Been, 
Fairness, supra note 89, at 1064 n.340. "In short, the treatment as equals notion of 
fairness provides an 'entitlement to process or rationale, not to an outcome ... .''' Id. 
(quoting Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 Soc. SCI. INFO. 
483, 484 (1988)). 
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rent intent standard should be lowered, particularly for enVIron­
mental civil rights plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court has often stated that while stare decisis is 
not an "inexorable command," the doctrine is "of fundamental im­
portance to the rule of law," and precedent should not be over­
turned absent a "special justification."115 Tomorrow's 
environmental justice advocates may wish to argue that the role 
aversive racism plays in modern-day LULU siting decisions, as evi­
denced by decades of disparate impact data,116 provides such a spe­
cial justification for a departure from the existing intent-based 
standard set out in Arlington Heights 117 and Davis.118 While this 
proposal is admittedly susceptible to "slippery slope" attacks, it 
stresses that a departure is warranted in the environmental civil 
rights context alone, and that other contexts involving racial dis­
crimination should still be governed by Arlington Heights and Da­
vis, until such time as claimants in these non-environmental 
contexts can furnish evidence compelling enough to merit their own 
"specific justification." 
Recognizing the insurmountable barriers that environmental 
civil rights plaintiffs face, several commentators have suggested al­
ternative standards of proof for courts to use, or legislatures to im­
plement to help ease the burden. These alternatives, while similar 
in purpose and design, have their own nuances which speak to their 
merits. In the event that this article's "special justification" propo­
sal passes muster with the Court and the Court queries which stan­
dard to apply, the following three proposals offer guidance: 
a. Godsil's statutory proposal - the "disparate impact" model119 
Professor Rachel Godsil has suggested a legislative proposal, 
fashioned after Title VII that would create a "disparate impact" 
115. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002) (citations omitted). 
116. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SUR· 
ROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983); see also COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED 
CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) (results 
of both studies showing the consistent national pattern of race as the most significant 
determinant of the location of hazardous waste facilities). 
117. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 6. 
118. 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see supra text accompanying note 7. 
119. While Godsil's work was intended as a proposal for statutory change, history 
has shown that the common law is no stranger to shifting burdens of proof and lowering 
evidentiary standards where justice demands. The standards Godsil sets forth can just 
as easily be handed down by the courts as by the legislature. 
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model in which minority communities would have a viable judicial 
remedy.120 Under Title VII, our nation's leading equal employ­
ment statute, plaintiffs are not required to prove that their employ­
ers harbored a discriminatory purpose in order to win their 
claim.121 Instead, Title VII proscribes any employment practice 
that has a negative "disparate impact" on minorities.122 Because 
Godsil believes the focus of courts should rest more on conse­
quences of site selections, and less on the motivations behind them, 
her proposed Act would assess liability wherever LULU sitings dis­
criminatorily impact minority communities, irrespective of any 
proof of intent.123 
Under Godsil's Title VII-based model, the burden would first 
be on the plaintiffs to establish discriminatory impact.124 "Once ... 
established, . . . the burden would shift to the defendant state 
agency to establish that the decision is an 'environmental neces­
sity.' "125 The plaintiff then has the burden of proving the existence 
of alternative, available LULU sites.126 If met, the burden shifts 
back "to the defendant to prove that the chosen site was necessary 
to safely dispose of hazardous wastes."127 Therefore, it is quite pos­
sible that LULUs 'could continue to be sited in minority neighbor­
hoods, provided that environmental safety concerns were the 
determinative factor in the siting process. 
Godsil's proposal has the potential to satisfy most interested 
parties. While those who wish to site the plant in a minority neigh­
borhood will be concerned about their bottom line if their initial 
site is rejected, and while minority populations will likely take issue 
with having a hazardous land use in their community (should their 
proposed alternative sites be denied), theoretically everyone wins 
120. Godsil, supra note 77, at 421. It should be noted that at the time her propo­
sal was written, Prof. Godsil was a student at the University of Michigan Law School. 
She is now a full-time professor at Seton Hall University Law School. 
121. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("[Title VII] proscribes 
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation."); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642,645-46 (1989), super­
seded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat., 1074, as recog­
nized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
431). 
122. Id. 
123. Godsil, supra note 77, at 422. 
124. Id. at 422-23. 
125. Id. at 422. Godsil notes that prima facie evidence of an "environmental ne­
cessity" might exist if the site is proven to be "environmentally suitable." Id. at 422-23. 
126. Id. at 423. 
127. Id. 
317 2006] FIGHTING THE GOOD FIGHT 
under a scheme that places LULUs in the most environmentally­
suitable location. Environmental suitability, after all, is one of the 
few truly race-neutral site-selection criteria that exists.128 
b. Boyle's "intermediate scrutiny" proposal 
Finding that environmental-justice plaintiffs have no legal re­
course against aversive, institutional racism under current equal 
protection law, and that courts should engage in a deeper analysis 
of the subjective intent of the defendant, commentator Edward 
Boyle argues for the application of intermediate scrutiny to all state 
actions with a significant disparate impact on suspect classes.129 
Under this approach, the burden would be placed initially on the 
plaintiffs to prove that a disparate impact on a suspect class did, in 
fact, occur.130 If proven, the burden would shift to the defendants, 
who would be expected to show that the suspect class's "interests 
were represented adequately in the decisionmaking process. "131 If 
met, the burden would ultimately shift back to the plaintiffs who 
would now be required "to show that the representation was inade­
quate or that some other substantial process defect ... undermined 
the effectiveness of the [class's] representation" at the decisionmak­
ing table.132 
128. Whatever racial biases may stem from the use of environmental suitability as 
the sole or touchstone criterion for site-making decisions are likely to be biases benefi­
cial to minority communities. Given the current disproportionate amount of 
Brownfields and Superfund sites located in communities of color, the likelihood of find­
ing neighboring or adjacent land more environmentally suitable than land in a predomi­
nantly white neighborhood that has had few-if any-environmentally undesirable uses 
over its history is rather slim. 
129. Boyle, supra note 53, at 988-89. It should be noted that at the time of his 
proposal, Edward Boyle was a student at Vanderbilt University Law School. He is cur­
rently a partner with the law firm of Hoguet Newman & Regal, LLP in New York. 
130. [d. at 980. This could be proven through evidence that concludes that an 
inordinately large number/percentage of class members were disadvantaged by the de­
cision. [d. at 980-81. To rebut the plaintiffs assertion, defendants would be allowed to 
proffer evidence that a "substantial number" of whites were also affected by the deci­
sion. [d. at 981. Boyle strongly suggests that courts be skeptical of such counter-evi­
dence, however, since institutionalized discriminatory acts are "necessarily 
overinclusive," and are thus likely to "affect a sizable number of whites as well." [d. He 
believes courts should be willing to consider aversive racism in the context of assessing 
the persuasiveness of defendant's evidence. [d. at 980-81. 
131. [d. at 981. Boyle suggests that defendants can make a prima facie showing 
of adequate representation by not only proving that suspect class members were part of 
the process, but that these members were "fully informed about the detriments and 
risks the decision would bring to bear on class members." [d. 
132. [d. According to Boyle, some factors assessing the adequacy of the class's 
representation include: 
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The level of scrutiny the defendant's decision would have to 
withstand would depend on whether the suspect class was ade­
quately represented. A finding that the class had adequate repre­
sentation, and that there were no process defects in the 
decisionmaking, would trigger a rational-basis reviewp3 However, 
if either inadequate representation, or substantial process defects 
are found, Boyle argues that the court should raise the level of scru­
tiny to assess whether the defendant's decision "considered suffi­
ciently the interests of those affected. "134 In its assessment, the 
court should balance the severity of disparate impact on one side, 
with "the inadequacy of representation and the nature of the gov­
ernment interest at stake" on the otherP5 
Given that the government is likely to have more access to evi­
dence concerning the decisionmaking process, Boyle further sug­
gests that any siting decision showing both disparate impact and 
inadequate representation should be presumed to be illicitly dis­
criminatory.136 The only way to defeat this presumption would be 
for defendants to either prove that "they considered the affected 
group's interests despite the representational inadequacy, or that 
the government interest was so high as to warrant a lack of repre­
sentation."137 Under this intermediate-scrutiny proposal, Boyle be­
lieves the "chokehold grip" that Arlington Heights and Davis have 
placed on subsequent equal protection cases will be "loosened" just 
enough for minority plaintiffs detrimentally affected by siting deci­
sions to be afforded justice.138 
c. Evans's tort-based standard of liability 
Professor Jill Evans refuses to dismiss discriminatory impacts 
[1] The [actual] number of minority representatives ... ; [2] whether these 
representatives were chosen by the affected groups or by the [non-class] deci­
sionmakers; [3] the amount of communication between the affected parties 
and the representatives; [4] the completeness and accuracy of information 
made available to those affected and their representatives; [5] the considera­
tion given to less intrusive alternatives; and [6] whether these representatives 
had incentives that ran counter to the interests of the affected group. 
Id. at 981-82. I would argue that three additional factors should be included: (7) the 
role these representatives had in the process (active vs. passive); (8) whether the repre­
sentatives were granted opportunities to voice their opinions; and (9) and how much 
the representatives' opinions were weighed/valued in the final decisionmaking process. 





138. [d. at 989. 
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as lacking in racial animus simply because the animus is cloaked in 
allegedly "neutral" processes.139 Evans believes that the burden on 
environmental justice plaintiffs can, and most certainly should be 
lightened by holding LULU-siting decisionmakers to a standard of 
tort-based liability.140 She urges that the intent standard of civil 
tort law-and not contemporary constitutional law-is the most ap­
propriate proxy by which to measure discriminatory animus in the 
limited context of environmentally-hazardous siting decisions.141 
Her proposal rests on two premises: (1) courts should no longer 
refrain from reviewing or inquiring into the administrative conclu­
sions of site-selection decisionmakers claiming to use "race-neu­
tral" criteria;142 and 
(2) where facially-neutral criteria in fact can be characteristically 
associated with a disproportionate percentage of a suspect class, 
'invidious purpose' is met upon a showing that the government 
official or body knew with 'substantial certainty' that application 
of the criteria would result in the disadvantaging of the suspect 
class.143 
As with Boyle's proposal, Evans's expanded notion of "intent" 
fully takes into account the existence of unconscious/aversive ra­
cism. Her proposal does not merely cause an inference of illicit dis­
crimination, but rather a presumption of such, in cases where the 
government action results in inevitable and foreseeable adverse 
consequences to protected classes.144 If there exists a "substantial 
certainty" that a particular siting decision will adversely impact mi­
nority communities to a greater extent than a similarly-situated 
white community, Evans says it is fair to presume that governmen­
tal decisionmakers "intended" this lopsided, discriminatory out­
come.145 Since the tort law's concept of intent "is grounded in the 
notion that a person 'intends' the natural and probable conse­
quences of his action,"146 she argues that it only seems appropriate 
to apply tort methods to government officials whose siting and per­
mitting decisions all but guarantee a racially-biased result.147 
139. Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining 
the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219,1273-77 (1998). 
140. See id. at 1288, 1295-1303. 
141. Id. at 1288. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1299. 
145. Id. at 1300. 
146. Id. at 1296. 
147. Id. at 1295-96. 
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B. Civil Rights Suits Serve an Educational Function 
Litigating environmental civil rights suits may ultimately be a 
fruitless enterprise, but at least it puts the community at issue, as 
well as other communities throughout the region on notice of a so­
cial issue that needs rectifying.148 Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
local grassroots campaigns to fail to receive the media attention 
that their causes deserve.149 Yet published legal opinions, and the 
press that goes along with them, have the potential to reach a larger 
audience that may be sympathetic to the movement. The more au­
thoritative the court in which these cases are litigated, and the more 
press these cases receive, the more communities benefit by learning 
about the current justice issues surrounding race, poverty, and the 
environment. 
Taking matters to court also inspires members of the affected 
communities to take action because it shows them that there are 
individuals willing to represent their civil rights, who will stand be­
hind their cause and not kowtow to unfair and uninvited industry 
oppression. Notwithstanding the contentions of Luke Cole,150 law­
yers can contribute a great deal to the legal sophistication of af­
fected communities by instructing community members on the 
substantive and procedural aspects behind siting and permitting 
processes. 
To be sure, any future legal victory will lend enormous credibil­
ity to the movement, extending far beyond the locales of the af­
fected community. Alice Brown, attorney for the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, has argued that even in light of the 
limitations on civil rights actions in the environmental justice con­
text, "there is a place, indeed, a need, for civil rights [lawyers] to 
participate in this arena."151 
C. Litigation as an Obstruction Device 
Finally, and perhaps as a last resort, environmental civil rights 
plaintiffs should look to litigation as a means of obstruction. By 
continuing to bring suits that challenge LULU sitings, environmen­
148. Austin & Schill, supra note 37, at 75. 
149. See id. at 76 ("[T]he media is generally accused of paying too little attention 
to protests in low-income minority communities."). 
150. See Cole, Three Models, supra note 39, at 687, 703-04 (suggesting that the 
legal process disempowers communities by stripping them of the knowledge necessary 
to fight on their own behalf); supra text accompanying notes 43-46. 
151. Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice and Civil Rights, RACE, POVERTY & 
ENV'T, Fall 2004-Winter 2005, at 39. 
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tal civil rights advocates force the opposition to react to their initia­
tive during a stalemate in negotiations or a losing public relations 
battle.152 By attacking siting decisions at every turn, advocates can 
use the lengthy and costly legal process to slow down the processes 
of implementing siting plans. This not only forces industry to pay 
for any environmental injustices they wish to levy, but also affords 
more time to grassroots organizers fighting to amend or enact legis­
lation to further their justice goals. 
Environmental civil rights litigation would not be the primary 
focus of the justice movement as a whole, but instead would act as a 
strategically-utilized diversionary device that would keep industry 
occupied in the courts, while community groups could attack siting 
decisions, and the system itself, from the ground up. While such a 
legal tactic may appear ethically questionable on its face, this article 
in no way proposes that advocates should bring frivolous claims. 
The claims furthered by environmental justice advocates should al­
ways be brought to court in good faith; but with the knowledge that 
the likelihood of success is slim to none, advocates should know 
that while the courts are considering the merits, alternative avenues 
of attack are being furthered outside the courtroom. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Even assuming that most of today's environmental injustices 
are genuine bypro ducts of the marketplace, and not "intentionally" 
discriminatory, such injustices are neither legitimate, nor acceptable 
by virtue of this fact alone. Even when a decision is made solely on 
economic grounds, the decision discriminates so long as a particular 
community is impacted disparately. Any time a minority commu­
nity is forced to bear a disproportionate burden of the state's envi­
ronmental hazards-whether the motivating factor behind the 
burden centers on the community's race, income, or lack of political 
clout-discrimination is subtly at work. If we continue to let "free 
market" ideals perpetuate existing inequalities along race lines, and 
continue to let "good economics" determine what is good law, we 
are left with communities plagued with longstanding social inequity, 
with no recourse or remedies in sight. 
Achieving environmental equity will no doubt require a crea­
tive mixing of means and methods. In battle, one's odds of success 
152. See SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR, 53 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., Running Press 
2003) ("[I]f the enemy is rested, you can tire him ... if he is at rest, you can move 
him."). 
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increase proportionally with the amount of fronts one chooses to 
attack from.153 Allowing the affected communities to have a voice 
on the decisionmaking board, or for new race-neutral criteria to be 
considered in the decisionmaking process, or even for corporate, 
industry, and government officials to be held to account for the 
aversive racism that undermines their decisions, are tactics not 
wholly beyond the judiciary's purview. Our nation's courts have 
always been willing to shift burdens of proof, evidentiary standards, 
and amend or implement regulatory policy when justice so 
demands. 
Lawyers certainly have many important roles to play, both "on 
the ground" alongside the communities they represent and in their 
various administrative and technical roles. Future litigation in 
search of remedial action for past injustices is just as important to 
the movement, if not as necessary. The fundamental civil rights is­
sues at play, when combined with the relative indigence and insol­
vency of the plaintiff classes involved, make most LULU siting 
cases fertile ground for pro bono litigation. If more lawyers were 
willing to take on these types of environmental justice cases in a pro 
bono capacity, the arguments concerning waste and misallocation 
of community and grassroots resources no longer would be 
persuasive.154 
Admittedly, in practice this thesis has its shortcomings, and 
novel legal claims such as the ones proposed in Part I.A.2 are rather 
unlikely to persuade the High Court as it is currently composed. 
But the means suggested in this paper only scratch the surface of a 
statutory landscape chock-full of potential remedies for environ­
mental justice plaintiffs. One of the greatest conventions of the 
American legal system is that it always leaves room to argue a 
good-faith claim. Whether we continue to look for evidence suffi­
cient to meet the strict Yick Wo and Gomillion standards, or tread 
new ground with novel constitutional theories, it is clear that law­
yers acting in their capacity as litigators still have a role to play, and 
grassroots organizations and lawyers should strive for complemen­
tary approaches to fighting environmental injustices. 
153. Id. at 56-57 ("If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, 
then the forces we will engage will be few. If no positions are left undefended, there 
will not be any places with more than a few."). 
154. However, a whole new question arises as to whether there are enough pro 
bono attorneys available, and whether those that are up to the task would be willing to 
devote what limited pro bono hours they have to litigating cases that have often re­
sulted in failure. 
